#Pazuru azuattack password#
This is a special account that can’t be deleted, nor can the name be changed, and its password is used to derive a cryptographic key for encrypting the TGTs that the KDC issues. The security principal used by the KDC in any domain is the krbtgt account. However, the introduction of this new passwordless experience changed things a bit: as we could see in the previous flow, Azure AD can now issue Kerberos TGTs for one or more domains! This brought to my mind another question, what about the krbtgt account ? Up to now, only the Key Distribution Center (KDC) service, located on the Domain Controller, had the authority to issue TGTs. What is all this? Let’s start to dig into this. So, what do we have here? Partial TGTs trading for fully ones, and Kerberos Server keys replicated in the cloud. An authentication flow would be as follows: Let’s suppose I want to access to Service 1 that runs in the Server A. Roughly speaking, Kerberos issues two kind of tickets, a Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) that validates the identity of a principal, and a Service Ticket used by the principal to authenticate against other services in the domain. It’s based on symmetric cryptography (shared secrets) and uses the concept of tickets to validates those identities. Kerberos is the main authentication protocol that is used to verify the identity of a security principal (a user or a host) in a Windows domain. But what does it mean? At first glance, since we’re talking about SSO capabilities to on-premises resources, we should also talk about Kerberos. As I mentioned before, Microsoft expanded the passwordless experience to on-premises resources with Azure Active Directory. What we found was even better: a new credential gathering attack vector involving Read Only Domain Controllers servers! Let’s take a look at all the way from researching new functionality to implementing a new attack on Impacket. How did they do it? How does it work? Kerberos are you there? Microsoft had previously released the same functionality only for Azure AD-joined devices, but now the scope has been expanded to Hybrid environments. The FIDO2 security key became the access key to the two kingdoms.
#Pazuru azuattack windows 10#
So, the idea was simple, you could sign-in to your hybrid Azure AD-joined Windows 10 device and automatically access both cloud and on-premises resources. That was a passwordless authentication functionality that provides seamless single sign-on (SSO) to on-premises resources, using security keys such as the famous FIDO2 keys. Some time ago Microsoft released a very cool feature that caught our attention.
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